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Future citizenship 
 
The concept of citizenship embodies the ways in which people, collectively, relate to each              
other through the exercise of formal and informal rights, responsibilities, duties and            
entitlements. Citizenship is most often understood in relation to the nation: it defines how              
people within the same nation live and the common sense of identity they come to share.  
Today, it can seem as if these shared assumptions about what it means to be a citizen of a                   
nation are being called into question. The contested nature of citizenship lies at the heart of                
debates on immigration, the welfare state, policing, education and, of course, Brexit. 
Some now deride citizenship as a narrowly nationalistic and exclusive preoccupation. The            
rights and entitlements associated with citizenship – freedom of speech, movement and            
association; the right to participate in elections, to seek police protection and legal redress,              
and to apply for state benefits or healthcare - are challenged for masking divisions rather               
than underpinning equality. Some feel that the division between citizen and non-citizen (for             
example with regard to citizens of other EU states working in the UK) is too rigid or lacks                  
justification. The slogan ‘no borders’ calls into question not just the validity of the nation but                
also the possibility of national citizenship. 
Shared assumptions about what it means to be 
a citizen of a nation are being called into 
question. 
Different understandings of citizenship are made concrete in our values. Society appears            
increasingly divided between those who identify with the nation and their particular place             
within it and those who reject this identity - groups defined by David Goodhart as               
‘somewheres’ and ‘anywheres’. The response to the result of the Brexit referendum            
revealed that UK citizens do not share a common view of democracy or how they should be                 
able to participate in it. In particular, the EU referendum pitted ‘citizens of the world’,               
mobile, relatively wealthy and adopting a cosmopolitan wordview, against ‘citizens of           
somewhere’, rooted, with loyalties to locality and nation.  
In this collection of essays, ​Jim Butcher questions the moral authority granted to             
cosmopolitanism that is often counterposed unfavourably to being a citizen of a nation. He              
argues that national citizenship is vital to meaningful democracy and no barrier to             
internationalism. It is the nation state that today provides the source for a revived sense of                
citizenship and democratic involvement. 
James Hodgson considers the rise of legalism, the turn towards handing powers that once              
lay with elected representatives over to unelected judges, specifically in relation to the             
recent trajectory of left-wing politics and attempts to thwart Brexit. He notes that it has               
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been a party of the left, ostensibly a party of ‘people power’, that has embraced legalism                
and diminished the capacity of citizens to exercise control over the destiny of their nation.               
He argues that Labour’s disclaiming of the fundamental importance of democratic           
accountability meant it missed an historic opportunity in its approach to the vote to leave               
the EU. 
Discussions of migration are central to citizenship today. Vanessa Pupavac examines the            
United Nations ​Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration​, a document that             
speaks to current thinking on migration. It has been developed by the UN, and reflects the                
outsourcing of national responsibility for the question of migration. Pupavac examines the            
vision of global migration underpinning the compact. She questions whether free movement            
is an unmitigated good and considers the impact of immigration upon citizenship in both the               
generating and receiving nations. 
National citizenship is vital to meaningful 
democracy and no barrier to internationalism. 
Citizenship is also about how we live together in local, as well as national, contexts. Where                
geographically close communities effectively live apart, can we talk about a common society             
in which we seek to live and act together? ​Rakib Ehsan​’s essay sets out some important                
perspectives on the importance of integration as a part of shared citizenship. He explores              
how integration can mitigate extremism and cultivate shared values and asks how a             
recognition of these benefits could influence the UK’s approach to immigration.  
Education prepares people for citizenship through imparting a shared tradition of           
knowledge. Yet the role of schools in citizenship is contested. ​Alex Standish argues that              
there has been a hollowing out of the moral content of education ​for its own sake​. He claims                  
that the emphasis on various instrumental and extrinsic goals and the deprioritisation of             
knowledge at the centre of schools’ curricula and mission, mark a failure to foster national               
citizenship. 
This collection of essays sets out a range of challenging perspectives with citizenship the              
common thread. They should become points of reference in the important debates ahead             
on who we are, how we live and how we shape our future together. 
 
 
***** 
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Whither national citizenship? Jim Butcher 
 
At the 2016 Conservative Party conference then Prime Minister Theresa May asserted, “if             
you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don’t                 
understand what citizenship means.” Subsequently, some opponents of implementing the          
vote to leave the EU adopted the label ‘citizen of nowhere’ as an ironic rejection of British                 
citizenship. They emphasise their status as ‘citizens of the world’, as well as bemoaning the               
loss of ‘European citizenship’, in order to differentiate themselves from a perceived            
narrowness and exclusive nationalism they consider characteristic of the Leave vote and            
national sovereignty.  
There is no doubt that the vote to leave the European Union exposed divisions in people’s                
orientation towards national citizenship. David Goodhart’s book ​The Road to Somewhere:           
The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics sets out this division in British politics in terms                 
of citizens of ​somewhere (a nation) and citizens of ​anywhere (those who adopt a              
supra-national or global identity). The latter, he argues, are associated with a more             
cosmopolitan and liberal value set while the former show a rootedness and identification             
with place. These divisions have characterised the post-EU referendum debate and indicate            
a lack of shared values and points of reference that have been important in relation to                
citizenship in the past.  
Citizenship is in crisis. But should we be looking towards supranational or national             
citizenship for answers? 
 
National citizenship vs global citizenship 
In essence, citizenship involves the relationship between an individual and a political            
community, historically and culturally defined, within which social organization is          
established and power legitimised and contested. The concept of citizenship originated in            
ancient Greece. Aristotle recognized man as a ​zoon politicon –a political animal. This feature              
of humanity was expressed through the ​polis ​, the ancient Greek city state. The Roman              
conceptualisation of citizenship established a legal relationship between citizen and state.           
The Italian City states of the Renaissance are also an important watershed in the              
development of citizenship, marking a shift away from people being considered subjects of a              
monarchy to citizens of a nation or city. In modern society, citizenship developed in the               
context of the nation state. Citizens have rights within the nation, sometimes inscribed in a               
constitution, as well as obligations under the law. This is encapsulated in the idea of a social                 
contract.  
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The civic republican conception of citizenship, championed by political theorist Hannah           
Arendt, emphasises the individual as an active part of the political determinations that             
shape the society in which he or she lives: citizens were not simply granted rights by nation                 
states. Demands for freedom, equality and suffrage comprise an intrinsic part of a nation’s              
history and they were acheived only as the result of heroic struggle. 
Global citizenship is a very different model. Here, identification with a wider community is              
emphasised above citizenship of a particular nation. Global citizenship transcends          
geographic and political borders and often presents rights and responsibilities as deriving            
from one’s status as a ‘citizen of the world’. It does not necessarily deny national citizenship,                
but the latter is often assumed to be more limited in a moral as well as spatial capacity.                  
Arguments for European citizenship run along similar lines; it is deemed to be more inclusive               
and better able to co-ordinate policy in a global world of so called ‘wicked’ interconnected               
problems. It endorses ‘free movement’ whilst national citizenship has been associated with            
exclusive nationalism and hostility to non-citizens. 
 
The limits of global citizenship 
Supranational versions of citizenship are enacted in three ways: through an identification            
with transnational bodies such as the European Union; through an orientation towards            
non-governmental organisations or charities; and through consumption and lifestyle         
initiatives such as Fair Trade shopping or ethical travel. All three versions of supranational              
citizenship share in a detachment of citizenship from the nation state. On this basis, there               
are clear arguments to be made against global citizenship and all forms of supra-national              
citizenship. 
Sociologist Bikhu Parekh has argued that: “If global citizenship means being a citizen of the               
world, it is neither practicable nor desirable” (2003, p. 12). Global citizenship is divorced              
from the institution of politics that matters most – national government. It is only in the                
context of the nation state that citizens can vote, or can strive for the vote, and through that                  
alter the law, campaign for rights and re-negotiate a social contract between individual and              
state. The distant notion of a world state is, according to Parekh, “remote, bureaucratic,              
oppressive and culturally bland,” (2003, p. 12).  
In bypassing national citizenship, global 
citizenship bypasses politics too. 
 
Geographer and education expert Alex Standish shares the view that global citizenship tends             
to bypass national politics in a world in which nations are the principal expressions of power                
and of democratic potential. He argues that cosmopolitan global citizenship seeks to shift             
authority from the national community to a world community, the latter a loose network of               
international organisations and subnational political actors outside of a clear democratic           
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constitutional framework (Standish, 2012). In bypassing national citizenship, global         
citizenship bypasses politics too. 
This critique further speaks to the enactment of citizenship through ethical consumption            
and activism via non-governmental organisations. No one, bar shareholders, votes for the            
directors of companies. Non-governmental organisations and non-profits are accountable         
to, at most, a self-selecting group of supporters. This may be entirely appropriate for such               
organisations but in no way represents a replacement for the rights of citizenship as              
previously understood. 
Global citizenship-oriented campaigns from non-governmental organisations often focus on         
individual behaviour change around, for example, recycling or ethical consumption. This is in             
sharp contrast to national citizenship which cannot be bought or sold but involves a              
collective commitment to entering into political dialogue with fellow citizens. National           
citizenship, unlike global citizenship, has the potential to bring about fundamental change in             
the way a particular society is organised. It is a qualitatively different form of citizenship. 
 
Is national citizenship too narrow? 
Of course, empathy, sympathy and an aspiration for change are not bounded by national              
borders. Neither is a person’s desire to make their mark on the world. For many people,                
greater mobility and wealth opens up new opportunities to live, work, holiday and campaign              
outside of the nation of their birth. This is to be celebrated. 
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, a 
globally oriented politics may be better served 
by a reinvigoration of national citizenship. 
But it is wrong to counterpose this, as some do, to a limited and parochial national                
citizenship. Campaigns, from the anti-Corn Law League to agitation for a united Ireland in              
the nineteenth century, from anti-nuclear protests to anti-racist campaigns in the twentieth            
century, have confronted political power at home in relation to issues recognised as being              
international in nature or global in scale. The tradition of working class internationalism,             
borne out of the belief that workers are united globally by their position in relation to their                 
employers and capitalism, has been national in form and international in content. Capitalism             
has also been justified with reference to its capacity to raise living standards and safeguard               
freedom around the world. An identification with national citizenship has never precluded            
global concerns.  
Thomas Paine famously said in ​The Rights of Man (1781): “The world is my country, all                
mankind are my brethren, and to do good is my religion,” yet spent his adult life agitating                 
for republican citizenship in the USA, France and the UK, precisely so free citizens could               
shape their destiny and ‘do good’. As Parekh argues, global politics may be better              
approached through a citizenship defined by a focus on political power and the national              
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institutions that wield it – a ‘globally oriented citizen’ (2003). Although it may seem              
counter-intuitive, a globally oriented politics may be better served by a reinvigoration of             
national citizenship. 
 
The limits of caring through global citizenship 
It is also notable that global citizenship tends to be couched in terms of care, awareness and                 
responsibility of individuals with regard to the world’s problems. These are all commendable             
virtues but tell us nothing about the ​political ​position an individual or society takes on a                
given issue. Private virtues, enacted through global citizenship, are limited in their capacity             
to address social and political problems. These require public scrutiny and debate in the              
light of different political perspectives and strategies. 
Those who emphasise private virtues, cut adrift from politics, too often fail to treat the               
objects of their concern as political agents themselves. In doing so, global citizenship often              
regards people in other countries as objects of humanitarianism rather than potentially            
active subjects - political citizens within their own nations. A high-profile example of this is               
that of young western ‘voluntourists’ who enact their global social aspirations through            
individual acts of care. In doing so they may perpetuate a stereotype of active, caring               
western subjects in constrast to the more passive but grateful objects of their concern.              
Global citizenship ​over here often fails to treat its putative beneficiaries as citizens ​over              
there​. 
Criticising the claims made for a global civil society of non-governmental organisations,            
David Chandler insightfully refers to a “blurring [of] the distinction between the citizen with              
rights of formal democratic accountability,” on the one hand, with the “merely moral claims              
of the non-citizen,” on the other (2005: 194). Chandler is not criticizing moral approaches              
per se​, but making a case for a politically engaged morality that acts democratically, in               
concert with others. This politically engaged morality requires a strong sense of national             
citizenship. 
 
Hannah Arendt and the importance of the public sphere 
Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy sheds further light on the limitations of global            
citizenship. She argues that the full realisation of human freedom requires the development             
of a public realm that represents the extension of human freedom beyond the private              
sphere of the family, private interest and intimate life. It requires bringing together the              
diversity of private experience and interest in an agonistic public space. Whilst “everyone             
sees and hears from a different position,” (Arendt, 1958: 57) this public space is the basis for                 
striving for a “word in common” (ibid: 58).  
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In modern societies, the public realm corresponds to the nation state: newspapers, legal             
and democratic systems are national in origin and reach. Arendt’s republican citizen is an              
active part of the political determinations of nation states, these being the principal             
institutions of power and authority. A citizen outside of a state can only ever exercise a                
limited form of citizenship and is unable to strive for a common world. Without the               
potential for politics to transcend or mediate differences, private experiences (by their very             
nature differential and varied) dominate.  
 
Conclusion 
Brexit involved a straightforward demand for national sovereignty to be strengthened           
through an end to the outsourcing of political authority to the supranational institutions of              
the EU. A new establishment and its supporters, grown used to decision making being              
shielded from national accountability, condemned Leave voters and politicians for rejecting           
liberal, cosmopolitanism values and, as they argued, embracing a narrow, atavistic           
nationalism. Some in this new establishment have adopted the ‘citizen of the word’ or              
‘citizen of nowhere’ tag to differentiate themselves, politically and morally, from their fellow             
citizens. They have derided the political choice of Leave voters as, at best, representing the               
‘little Englander’ parochialism of the uneducated and, at worst, a descent into fascism. The              
former is not borne out by evidence and the latter is fantastical ahistorical hyperbole. 
There is a need to restate the importance of national citizenship and to put into context the                 
lofty claims of global citizenship. The latter tends to abstract morality from the pre-eminent              
site of political power and democracy, the nation state, whereas the former assumes             
individual and national sovereignty and agency. Regardless of our views on Brexit and             
contemporary politics, national citizenship needs strengthening, not weakening. The         
alternative is to entrench divisions between those who have agency through their wealth,             
job and influence and those who must rely only on democracy and their vote to bring about                 
change.  
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Legalism and the Left James Hodgson 
 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the British left (which I leave undefined, but for                
ease of explanation we may regard as synonymous with the Labour Party) moved from              
scepticism about the power of the judiciary and the law in general to embrace an ideology                
which we might call legalism. Broadly speaking, legalism is a position which subordinates             
politics to law. This legalistic outlook has culminated in Labour’s transmutation into a party              
dominated by advocates for the UK to remain in the European Union and in the efforts of                 
the political establishment to thwart Brexit by judicial manoeuvrings. This move has been             
accompanied by an increasing distrust in the capacity of electoral politics to deliver social              
and economic reform and a gradual abandonment of Labour’s working-class origins. The            
promise of Corbynism was to reverse this trend and to re-engage with popular politics,              
however imperfectly this promise was realised in practice. In the wake of its disastrous              
electoral defeat and with some form of Brexit imminent, the Labour Party will be tempted               
to return to the siren call of legalism. This, I shall argue, would be yet another catastrophic                 
mistake.  
 
Legalism as political ideology 
What is legalism? Simply put, legalism is a political ideology (by which I simply mean here an                 
organising worldview) and a style of political governance that sees politics as separate from              
and subordinate to law.  
Rather than seeking to achieve social and economic reforms through democratic means,            
legalists pursue their ends through anti-majoritarian means, specifically the courts, treaties,           
and other legal avenues. Certain social issues are thus placed beyond political contestation.             
In this way, the legalist approach ‘locks in’ certain aspects of the political-economic system,              
such as individual rights and private ownership of the means of production. We might              
therefore classify legalism as a species of technocracy, which seeks to resolve social conflicts              
not through public deliberation and electoral contest, but by placing them in the hands of               
non-political legal experts. Legalism, like all forms of technocracy, stands opposed to            
populism, to majoritarianism and to democratic pluralism. 
Legalism is a political ideology and a style of 
political governance that sees politics as 
separate from and subordinate to law.  
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Legalism, in the sense I use it here, must not be confused with constitutionalism or the rule                 
of law. All countries seek to ‘lock in’ certain features of their political systems by means of a                  1
constitution to organise political life. These are the ‘rules of the game’ which are a               
precondition for politics taking place at all; they specify, for example, the type of electoral               
system in use, the scope of the franchise, how legislation is passed, and so on. These                
procedural matters do not normally come within the scope of electoral contestation, except             
perhaps in matters of constitutional amendments decided by popular referendum (see, for            
example, the legalisation of same-sex marriage in the Republic of Ireland, 2015). Indeed, not              
only could normal politics not take place in the absence of such rules, but the virtues of                 
political leadership could not be realised. Just as superior players of games, such as chess,               
master the rules and various strategies for exceling within the boundaries of those rules, so               
superior politicians will master the political system and finds ways to achieve their goals              
within it.  
On a more prosaic level, we might say that legalism describes the attitude or outlook of the                 
legal profession. As one lawyer put it: “A lawyer is bound to certain habits of belief... by                 
which lawyers, however dissimilar otherwise, are more closely linked than they are            
separated… a man who has had legal training is never quite the same again… is never able                 
to look at institutions or administrative practices or even social or political policies, free              
from his legal habits or beliefs… He is interested in relationships, in rights in something and                
against somebody, in relation to others… This is what is meant by the legalistic approach…               
[A lawyer] will fight to the death to defend legal rights against persuasive arguments based               
on expediency or the public interest or the social good… He distrusts them… He believes, as                
part of his mental habits, that they are dangerous and too easily used as cloaks for arbitrary                 
action.”  2
Legalism represents a flight from democratic      
politics by an expansion of the role of judicial         
decision-making. 
What is wrong with legalism? Aside from giving work to judges, legalism represents a flight               
from democratic politics by an expansion of the role of judicial decision-making. Social             
conflicts are removed from the realm of politics, where they can be mediated through              
democratic forms of political contestation and decided by the necessary building of            
parliamentary majorities and placed into the realm of law, where they are to be answered               
by judges applying their technical-legal knowledge to arrive at an impartial decision. In this              
way, questions of substance are thus turned into questions of procedure and interpretation.             
However, judicial decision-making, if it is to be successful, must rest upon a political              
consensus, for both sides of the dispute must accept the decision of the adjudicator as               
impartial and binding. But in many deeply contentious conflicts, of course, no such             
1 In contrast to Shklar (1964) who defines legalism as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a 
matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules”. See J. 
Shklar (1964) ​Legalism ​(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 1-2. 
2 Griffith, quoted in Shklar (1964), p. 9.  
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consensus obtains. This is one reason why international politics is traditionally resistant to             
resolving disputes through legal mechanisms: there is no commonly accepted umpire or            
framework within which conflicts can be resolved.  
Legalism is inherently depoliticising, as it seeks to ground policies in the intellectual             
authority of experts rather than the popular authority of the demos. Yet, at the same time,                
legalism as a strategy is deeply political, albeit one orientated towards politics in a purely               
negative way. The removal of controversial issues from public deliberation and decision and             
into the hands of experts is usually politically motivated, often by a scepticism about the               
ability of the demos to reach a just and wise decision. Politics does not evaporate from the                 
decision-making process, however, as under legalism social conflicts become absorbed into           
the basic structure of the state. The law is no longer considered a malleable product of the                 
political sphere; rather, it becomes an overtly politicised instrument, with the judiciary itself             
becoming a site of political contestation and begins to find its legitimacy drawn into              
question. In short, instead of turning politics into law, legalism ends up politicising the law               
itself. To borrow from the political theorist Glen Newey: “It’s like squashing a ruck in the                
carpet: power simply shifts elsewhere. Whether or not judges enjoy a bigger share of              
practical wisdom than the next person, kicking political decisions upstairs from the bear pit              
to the bench will not somehow make them not political.”  3
Legalism is inherently depoliticising, as it seeks       
to ground policies in the intellectual authority       
of experts rather than the popular authority of        
the demos.  
One only has to look to the United States and the fierce battles fought around the                
nominations to the Supreme Court to see how political conflicts reappear in different and              
often more vituperative forms. Many controversial social issues, such as abortion, which            
represent not merely claims by disputing litigants but fundamentally different worldviews,           
are never truly resolved by legalistic means. On the contrary, such issues become ​less              
amenable to public deliberation and discussion, not more. This is because when democracy             
takes the form of an open-ended contest, the losing side has an incentive to live with the                 
result on the understanding they will have an opportunity to overturn the decision at the               
next election. In the legalistic mode, by contrast, the opportunity to influence the law on               
such issues becomes a rare event. In seeking to push such issues out of the political sphere,                 
the legalist makes political instability and extremism more likely, as the losers to a judicial               
decision can justifiably claim they have been excluded from public life.  
 
From radicalism to legalism 
3 G. Newey (2009) “Ruck in the Carpet”, ​The London Review of Books​, Vol. 31, No. 13. Available online at: 
https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v31/n13/glen-newey/ruck-in-the-carpet 
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The British left’s turn from politics to law is complex and spans much of the twentieth                
century, so the story I tell here is necessarily incomplete. It is safe to say, however, that the                  
roots of the left’s radical tradition are grounded in a scepticism about the power of the                
judiciary and the law in general. It is not hard to see why. The judiciary was and remains an                   
elitist institution in terms of culture and social class. The experience of the early labour               4
movement was one of a hostile judiciary, with the legal arm of the state deployed to                
suppress trade union activity and ‘seditious speech’. Infamous cases such as the conviction             
and transportation of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, who combined to form the Friendly Society of              
Agricultural Labourers to protest the gradual lowering of wages, are illustrative examples of             
the early encounters between the labour movement and the law courts. Such an attitude              
continued through the nineteenth and well into the early twentieth century and the             
inter-war years, with the courts seen as an obstacle to, rather than as a vehicle for, the                 
advancement of the social and economic reforms desired by the left.  
The experience of the early labour movement       
was one of a hostile judiciary, with the legal         
arm of the state deployed to suppress trade        
union activity and “seditious speech”. 
This picture of judicial scepticism contrasts with the prevailing image of judicial power             
promulgated in today’s public discourse; that of fair-minded judges acting as a bulwark             
against the tyranny of majority opinion and against governmental abuses of power. The fact              
that this (liberal) image of the judiciary has become part of the furniture of left-leaning               
public discourse suggests the extent to which the left has been colonised by liberals and by                
the professional legal class. Indeed, one might chart Labour’s turn to legalism by its              
adoption of human rights legislation on both the domestic and international fronts.            
Members of the post-war Labour government (1945-51) were opposed to the creation of             
the European Court of Human Rights, rightly understanding the conservative intentions of            
such a body to act as a restraint on state interventions in national economies. Throughout               5
the mid-twentieth century, Labour’s manifestos reflected this wisdom, protecting individual          
rights through parliamentary statute. Over time, however, Labour came to propose the            
enshrinement of constitutional rights, culminating in the Blair government’s incorporation          
of the European Convention of Human Rights into British law as the Human Rights Act               
(1998) and enthusiasm for the European Union. Thus, Labour’s embrace of legalism was             
consummated.  
Why did this migration from judicial scepticism to full-blown legalism take place? One             
reason is economic. During the 1950s and 1960s Britain’s Empire was dismantled and many              
of its former colonies pursued ‘import substitution’ policies – raising tariffs on imports in the               
hopes of encouraging their domestic economies. Hopes for privileged access the US market             
4 See J. A. G. Griffith (1997) ​The Politics of the Judiciary​, 5​th​ Edition (London: Fontana Press).  
5 See M. Duranti (2017) ​The Conservative Human Rights Revolution: European Identity, Transnational Politics, 
and the Origins of the European Convention​ (Oxford: Oxford University Press). See also M. Evans (2003) 
Constitution-Making and the Labour Party​ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 167. 
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faded in the face of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the global               
tariff-reduction regime. The British political class therefore turned towards the European           6
Economic Community (EEC) in the hopes of securing economic growth and re-establishing            
some of its waning international influence. A large part of the Labour party of the 1960s and                 
70s opposed membership on the grounds that the EEC would undermine the British left’s              
ability to direct and intervene in the economy. In the campaign for the 1975 referendum,               
many figures on the left, such as Michael Foot and Tony Benn, raised these points               
eloquently in televised debates with leading Labour and Tory politicians. (These debates still             
resonate today and reveal how intellectually impoverished our public discourse, to say            
nothing of our political class, has become in the intervening years ). Yet the ending of this                7
story is well-known. Britain voted to remain within the EEC and on the domestic front the                
rise of Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberalism and initial enthusiasm for the Single Market            
ushered in an era of electoral defeats for the Labour Party. Jacques Delors’ speech at the                
Trade Union Congress in 1988 was a watershed moment insofar as it convinced the Labour               
Party that the kind of social reforms they once attempted to secure by parliamentary              
majority might be advanced by European-level legislation. Out of electoral desperation they            
acceded, and a new political-economic strategy was inaugurated. Thus, the left’s embrace of             
legalism marched to the drumbeat of its accommodation with neoliberalism as the            
hegemonic economic doctrine of our time.  
The Left’s embrace of legalism marched to the        
drumbeat of its accommodation with     
neoliberalism as the hegemonic economic     
doctrine of our time.   
Another reason for the left’s embrace of legalism, although more difficult to pin down, is               
sociological or class based. The Labour Party hosts a long tradition of Fabian democratic              
socialism, representing an alliance between the affluent middle-classes and the          
working-classes. Many of the party’s greatest leaders, including Clement Attlee, were drawn            
from this upper-middle-class social stratum. In recent decades, however, it appears that an             
increasing number of the party’s ​caporegimes have been of this social background, as well              
as being drawn from within the legal profession. Both John Smith and Tony Blair trained as                8
lawyers, as did several of their chief lieutenants. Without wanting to make too much of this                
association, it is not unreasonable to assume these Labour politicians held a worldview             
more comfortable with and congenial to an outlook of legalism than would otherwise have              
been the case. In many respects, Labour became a party colonised by the legal profession.               
This change in the leadership was reflected by a change in the culture and the composition                
6 C. Bickerton (2016) ​The European Union: A Citizen’s Guide​ (Penguin Books), p. 158. 
7 Several of these debates are available to watch online. For the debate between Michael Foot and Edward 
Heath: ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CuZrzwm6CJs​, and for the debate between Tony Benn and Roy 
Jenkins: ​https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_zBFh6bpcMo​.  
8 See M. Bovens and A. Wille (2017​) Diploma Democracy: The Rise of Political Meritocracy​ (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). For an American perspective, see N. Carnes (2013) ​White-Collar Government: The Hidden 
Role of Class in Economic Policy Making​ (London: University of Chicago Press). 
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of the party more broadly. Though not a scientific observation, to an outsider the Labour               
Party of today appears less a working-class movement than a convention of public sector              
managers, academics, students, and young professionals, many of whom feel comfortable           
with a liberal, rights-based orientation in politics and do not see why constitutional matters              
should not be decided by the ‘better educated’ or those in possession of technical expertise.  
This retreat into the judicial framework of the European Union and the valorisation of the               
law courts, and the change in Labour’s cultural make-up, has been brought to a crescendo               
with the party’s position on Brexit. Though not favouring the outcome of the referendum,              
most Labour Members of Parliament were committed to honouring the choice to leave the              
European Union, including the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. Despite this             
formal acceptance, the three and a half years following the referendum gave rise to a series                
of skirmishes designed to frustrate or overturn its result, several of which have been fought               
in the courts. This was to be expected. The Labour Party as an institution has become so                 
wedded to the legalistic superstructure of the Single Market that it can scarcely imagine a               
future without it. Similarly, if there was to be a challenge to Brexit then it was likely to come                   
through the courts. In the realm of electoral politics, attempts by Labour to fudge the issue,                
and by the Liberal Democrats to simply ignore the referendum decision, have been met with               
decisive rejection. Which brings us to the present.  
 
What now? 
Blair’s ‘New Labour’ victory of 1997 may well have been the highpoint of the left’s electoral                
fortunes and of its dalliance with legalism. Given Labour’s disastrous outcome in the             
December 2019 election under Jeremy Corbyn, the party will naturally be tempted to return              
to the norms and habits that characterised Blair’s time in office. However, this would be to                
draw the wrong lesson from the failures of the Corbyn project. 
In many ways, Brexit is as much a backlash         
against the legalism of the British political class        
as against the EU itself. 
It was, in part, the foreclosure of radical politics – the sense among citizens that they could                 
not change their common life very much through the ballot box – that produced the               
frustrations that led to the Brexit vote. In many ways, Brexit is as much a backlash against                 
the legalism of the British political class as against the EU itself. It represents a desire for a                  
more flexible (and, at the risk of parochialism, quintessentially British) constitutional order            
in which electoral majorities can implement transformative social and economic reforms.           
The elevation of Jeremy Corbyn to the Labour leadership in 2015 presaged the Brexit vote,               
as a sincerely held yearning for a kind of politics that is simply not possible within the EU                  
and the rules governing the Single Market. This should not be discounted. Labour’s increase              
of the vote share in the 2017 election suggests that while many voters believed the party                
would honour the decision to Brexit, it remained a viable political project. Contrast this with               
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the 2019 result, when it became clear that Labour’s Brexit position was a Remain position in                
all but name, proposing a second referendum stacked in favour of remaining in the EU. This                
made a mockery not only of the power of voters to enact meaningful change through the                
ballot box, but also of Labour’s ambitious manifesto commitments, many of which – notably              
its battery of nationalisation schemes – could only be accomplished outside the Single             
Market and jurisdiction of the ECJ.  
Other factors were at work in both the 2017 and 2019 elections, not least the figure of                 
Corbyn himself and the historically low levels of voter confidence he instilled. However, the              9
promise of Corbynism – far more than the details of policies and plans to increase public                
spending – was a re-engagement with the electorate and the building of the kind of mass                
political movements not seen for almost a century. This is not insignificant. At a time when                
social democracy is in retreat throughout Europe, the increase in the membership of the              
Labour Party was a real achievement, suggesting an appetite for a different kind of mass               
politics and democratic engagement. While the public were not inclined to trust Corbyn for              
several reasons – ranging from his past dalliances with unsavoury extremist figures to his              
poor handling of Labour’s anti-Semitism crisis, as well as his equivocation over the party’s              
Brexit policy – the democratic project which he inspired is not only worth salvaging but may                
contain the seeds for Labour’s future renewal.  
 
The arc of history will travel in whichever        
direction the people wish it to travel. That is         
the great promise and the great hazard of        
democracy. 
Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour Party is now drawing to an end, and a new field of                 
candidates is emerging. After the scale of their recent defeat, and amid calls that the               
manifesto was ‘too left-wing’ and made public spending promises that were simply not             
credible, the party may well be tempted to seek to return to something like the legalistic                
heyday of the Blair years. To such an end, a candidate like Keir Starmer (also, not                
coincidentally, trained as a barrister and a former head of the Crown Prosecution Service)              
would be the natural choice. But this would be a mistake. It may have become something of                 
a comfort blanket among Labour’s supporters but it is nevertheless true that many of              
Labour’s economic policies did command widespread public support. It is entirely plausible            10
that a leader with left-leaning economic policies who had committed to honouring the             
referendum result (and who did not carry Corbyn’s personal baggage) would have won the              
9 See the Ipsos Mori polling data: 
https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/jeremy-corbyn-has-lowest-leadership-satisfaction-rating-a
ny-opposition-leader-1977  
10 See M. Goodwin (2 October 2019) ‘’Corbynomics’ is More Popular than You Think’, ​Bloomberg Opinion​, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-02/jeremy-corbyn-s-labour-party-are-onto-s
omething  
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2019 election handsomely. Indeed, it was the failure to do so that discredited Labour’s              
manifesto, not its ambitions for public ownership. For these ambitions were at odds with              
membership of the Single Market and thus not worth the paper they were written on.  
It would be an historical irony if the Conservatives – the party which has traditionally been                
the most enthusiastic about the European Union and the Single Market – were the party to                
deliver Brexit. But the Labour Party’s failure to grasp the political opportunity with which it               
was presented – and indeed the purpose for which it was founded – has been nothing short                 
of a historical tragedy. Despite Corbyn’s manifold failings, one thing he did achieve was to               
offer a glimpse of the possibilities for British politics in the years ahead, and to remind us                 
through his failures that the only secure basis for a genuinely transformative programme is a               
commanding democratic majority. Such a majority can never be taken for granted and             
needs to be renewed again and again and again. Such is the nature of democratic politics;                
there is no state of permanence, and the arc of history will travel in whichever direction the                 
people wish it to travel. That is the great promise and the great hazard of democracy.                
Outside of the legal structures of the EU, this kind of radical democratic politics is once again                 
possible. Whether the British left will take advantage of this remains to be seen.  
 
***** 
 
 
The Global Compact for Migration: political implications of global migration governance           
for citizens and migrants Vanessa Pupavac 
 
 
The United Nations (UN) Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) of          
2018 has been welcomed by migrant advocacy groups globally as affirming universal            
solidarities and non-discrimination towards migrants. The drafting of an intergovernmental          
compact arose from a heads of state and government summit at UN General Assembly in               
September 2016. The initiative was galvanised by the crisis unfolding in Europe the previous              
year with the arrival of thousands of migrants to the continent wanting to escape from               
conflicts, state collapse or poverty, and trying to travel onward to EU countries, mainly in               
northern Europe. A text was agreed by the UN in July 2019, and formally adopted in                
December 2018. 152 government representatives voted for the GCM in December 2018.            
Five states voted against the GCM: the United States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel              
and Poland. 
 
Outline of the Global Compact for Migration 
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The GCM outlines a ‘co-operative framework’ of 23 objectives, alongside a ‘​common            
understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose​’ (pp. 2-3). Migration is regarded            
as ‘a defining feature of our globalized world, connecting societies within and across all              
regions, making us all countries of origin, transit and destination’ (p. 2). Its rationale follows               
the idea that since migration is a transnational problem then transnational responses are             
required. Under the GCM, states are expected to co-ordinate their national border            
management, “promoting bilateral and regional cooperation, ensuring security for States,          
communities and migrants, and facilitating safe and regular cross-border movements of           
people while preventing irregular migration” and people trafficking (pp. 17-18). 
 
The text’s “common understanding” refers to developing a shared knowledge base from            
“diverse voices” in order to establish “multidimensional reality”. This should then inform            
“evidence-based policy making” and challenge misinformation and misleading narratives         
that “generate negative perceptions of migrants” (pp. 2-4, p. 7). Its ‘unity of purpose’              
implies a shared global political vision and shared political interests between “countries of             
origin, transit and destination” (p. 2). Under the umbrella of “shared responsibilities,” the             
GCM aims to “facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration, while reducing the incidence             
and negative impact of irregular migration” and “the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face”             
(pp. 3-4). A UK House of Commons research briefing explains how, “Within each objective it               
sets out a range of actions that can be drawn from in order to implement the objective”                 
(2018). The GCM looks to a “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approach, in           
which the objectives and policy actions are adopted across all levels of government and              
public institutions in partnership with relevant stakeholders, from migration advocacy          
groups to the media (p. 5).  
 
International political significance of the GCM 
 
The GCM describes itself as “a non-legally binding, cooperative framework”. It reaffirms the             
“sovereign right of states to determine their national migration policy and their prerogative             
to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law” (GCM            
2018, p. 2). The GCM does however imply the incremental construction of a global              
enforceable migration framework over states through embedding and socialising states into           
processes that will solidify into global customary law and practice. The document is of              
international legal significance for signatory and non-signatory states, as the GCM may in             
the future potentially be invoked as customary international law or an interpretative            
document in legal proceedings. 
The GMC joins other initiatives incrementally      
revising the UN’s relation to states and shifting        
from an international order organised around      
national self-determination of ​independent    
states to a global order organised around       
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transnational governance of ​interdependent    
states. 
 
Indicatively the text refers to being based on “the principles of non-regression and             
non-discrimination” (p. 4). The non-regression principle is associated with the          
reinterpretation of international law as higher transnational codes rather than a looser            
intergovernmental treaty-based system of law. The non-regression principle implies that          
norms adopted in the fields of human rights and the environment should not be reversed (p.                
4). In short, while formally being non-legally binding and affirming national sovereignty, the             
GMC joins other initiatives incrementally revising the UN’s relation to states and shifting             
from an international order organised around national self-determination of ​independent          
states to a global order organised around transnational governance of ​interdependent           
states.  
 
Role of the International Organisation for Migration 
 
The GCM designates the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) with new global            
responsibility as “the coordinator and secretariat of the [global] network” on migration (p.             
33). The IOM was established in Western Europe in 1951 in response to problems in               
postwar Europe (IOM website). For most of its existence, its role was largely confined to               
being a flexible, auxiliary, operational logistics agency favoured by Western governments. In            
the twenty-first century, the IOM has emerged as a flexible new tool of transnational              
migration governance and developing state compliance with the GCM. In this role it is              
displacing the centrality of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) whose mandate and            
institutional history is more closely tied to the UN system, and twentieth century             
international debates on labour, economic development and the international political          
economy. 
 
Regular versus irregular migration 
 
The GCM’s understanding of the rule of law and due process gives paramountcy to human               
rights, and seeks non-discrimination policies leaning towards treating people equally          
“regardless of their migration status” (p. 4). In the determination of cases, the GCM implies               
interpreting laws or regulations in favour of the migrant, and the burden of evidence being               
on the receiving host society seeking to disqualify individual migrants from entry or access              
to assistance. Significantly, the term ‘illegal’ is not in the document at all. Instead the GCM’s                
terminology turns on ​regular versus ​irregular migration, not legal versus illegal. The GCM is              
concerned to prevent discrimination between migrants and citizens, between regular and           
irregular migrants, and also to regularise the status of migrants without formal status (p. 4).               
So while the GCM allows states to distinguish between regular and irregular migrants and              
retains the objective of “preventing irregular migration,” its overall impact is to open such              
decisions to potential legal challenge (p. 18).  
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Politics of the GCM 
 
Advocates of the GCM have praised its framework for enhancing the position of regular and               
irregular migrants. Critics of the GCM have accused it of violating national sovereignty and              
undermining national immigration controls. These political controversies were generally         
confined to global social media spats and have been characterised as disputes between             
cosmopolitans and populists. There has been relatively little domestic debate or scrutiny in             
most signatory countries. Nevertheless, whilst it sometimes draws on and appeals to past             
ideals, the GCM’s transnational migration advocacy involves a fundamentally different          
understanding of global politics, economics and political community than past immigration           
campaigns. Democratic citizens, refugees and immigrants should all be concerned with a            
global economic and political vision which endorses a migratory economy and the demise of              
sovereign states.  
 
Globalisation and a migratory economy  
 
The GCM outlines a global migration economy organised around countries of origin, transit             
countries and countries of destination. Its typology of countries in the migration process             
accords with the world of periphery, semi-periphery and core countries, a world of             
‘combined and uneven development’ challenged by critical development studies. Yet the           
GCM’s economic globalisation recipe tends to reinforce these international inequalities          
whereby periphery supply states export human resources and raw materials for the core             
demand economies, and the semi-periphery become borderlands tasked with managing the           
migratory flows while also exporting their own human resources.  
 
Democratic citizens, refugees and    
immigrants should all be concerned     
with a global economic and political      
vision which endorses a migratory     
economy and the demise of sovereign      
states. 
 
Ironically, global migration advocacy can unwittingly legitimise economic globalisation,         
turning citizens into ideal exploitable, flexible migrant workers freed from the ties and             
defences of country and community. Freedom of movement of labour and capital, that is,              
labour to follow capital​, is in the interests of a globalised capitalist economy, but it is not                 
necessarily in the interests of labour or their countries. Where global capital has freedom of               
movement and free unconditioned supplies of labour, then it is easier for transnational             
companies to avoid the economic costs or social impact of their relocations on communities              
and the insecure workers they employ. Brushed over, too, are the social and economic              
problems for communities of depopulation on the one hand, or agglomeration on the other. 
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Remittances as sustainable development? 
 
The GCM links itself with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and its              
objectives see migration as contributing to “positive development outcomes” as well as            
realising global goals of sustainable development (p. 4, p. 26). Previously sustainable            
development was associated with community development and sustaining communities.         
Now globalisation and globalised migration is being championed as sustainable          
development. Private remittances represent greater sums than international development         
aid for many countries. One of the objectives of the GCM is promoting “faster, safer and                
cheaper transfer of remittances” and fostering “financial inclusion of migrants” (p. 27).            
Financial inclusion essentially concerns people having access to formal banking facilities to            
facilitate the transfer of remittances, the traceability of loans and debts, and monetary             
assistance and expenditure.  
 
Overall, do migration and remittances facilitate development in supply countries? The GCM            
assumes the positive benefits of migration but does not adequately address the problems of              
migration for the supply countries (Salt and Clout 1976, pp. 134-139). Foreign migration             
rises when there is not enough industrial development to absorb people moving from rural              
agricultural work to urban work. Temporary guest work has been seen as easing the              
pressures of population growth, budgetary crises or economic reform problems (Salt and            
Clout 1976). Remittances could help fuel economic development where there was a lack of              
capital investment in industries.  
Freedom of movement of labour and      
capital is in the interests of a globalised        
capitalist economy but it is not      
necessarily in the interests of labour.  
 
Yet historically, while migration may relieve unemployment or underemployment, it is not            
necessarily the unemployed, but the employed with skills, who get work and migrate (Salt              
and Clout 1976, p. 130). Many do not really learn new skills abroad, and have rather narrow                 
work roles (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 139). Thus the supply country loses skilled workers               
whose education or training it has invested in, diluting the skills level of the home workforce                
and even creating labour shortages in some sectors (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 139). The               
returning workers tend to be the less skilled rather than the highly skilled. Furthermore, the               
mass of remittances do not go into investment in industries and have little macro-economic              
impact (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 139). Instead remittances go into private family businesses              
or expenditure on housing or (foreign) consumer goods (Salt and Clout 1976, p. 138).              
Remittances may therefore enhance private security but foster social divisions within           
communities rather solidarities and further encourage migration rather than community          
change.  
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A crisis of international development and humanitarianism 
 
The new attention given to migration appears to be an expansion of global and social               
justice. However migration has come to the fore in global institutions as belief in the               
possibilities of transforming societies has contracted. The background to the GCM is the             
crisis of international development and humanitarianism. The field of international          
development has been incrementally retreating from its original ideals of national           
development universalising material prosperity. Humanitarianism expanded in the 1990s         
into humanitarian military interventions and international statebuilding but it too is in crisis             
with the spectacular failures of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The previous international            
development and humanitarian models were about developing or restoring communities,          
and reversing ethnic cleansing and returning refugees. Instead what is left of both fields is               
resilience governance, managing the responses of populations to insecurity and disaster.  
 
Migration has come to the fore in       
global institutions as belief in the      
possibilities of transforming societies    
has contracted. 
 
Patterns of migration reflect how individuals have given up changing the character of their              
government and country and instead are resorting to changing the country they live in to               
improve their lives (Krastev, 2014, 2017). Global advocacy celebrating migration ironically           
legitimises the demise of political self-determination and national development of the           
supply countries, countries in which the politics of TINA (‘there is no alternative’) push              
migrants to adopt the individualised strategy of exit. So while the GCM wants migrants to be                
“empowered as agents of change” and their “independence, agency and leadership” (pp.            
4-5) to be recognised, migration represents the hollowing out of supply countries as political              
communities, and the failures of global development and humanitarian strategies.  
 
Political community and home in the world  
 
Seventy years ago, the political theorist Hannah Arendt highlighted the problem of the             
stateless who lost their human rights when they lost their status as citizens of a country                
(Arendt 1968, [1950]). Global migration advocacy supporting a global compact on migration            
sees the primary guarantors of rights as international institutions rather than nation states.             
Their cosmopolitan ideals look to erode the distinctions between citizens and migrants (and             
between migrants and refugees) and expand global governance. Global codification of           
human rights addresses the problems Arendt raised at the formal level, but does not really               
address her insights on freedom and rights being substantially guaranteed through           
communal relations rather than higher legal appeal (Arendt 1968, [1950], p. 296). To erode              
the distinctions between citizens and migrants is to hollow out countries as political             
communities and citizens as self-determining subjects. Yet the patterns of migration           
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determining travel to specific countries suggest that migrants themselves want to ground            
their future security in political communities.  
Migration represents the hollowing out     
of supply countries as political     
communities, and the failures of global      
development and humanitarian   
strategies. 
 
Today’s global migration advocacy takes place in the context of an erosion of trust in               
political community and citizens. The political community tends to be seen as a threat to               
global values and migrants. Unfortunately a ‘no borders’ approach legitimises the global            
forces weakening the political community and its capacity to offer protections to both             
citizens and newcomers. Yet democratically persuaded communities are safer places to be            
hosted as a stranger. Global human rights protections are thinner guarantees than those             
secured through democratic persuasion. Developing global frameworks at a distance from           
societies does not involve the same democratically accountable relations, commitments and           
responsibilities for making policies work, and living with, implementing and addressing the            
consequences of our collective decisions.  
 
 
We need nationally based democratic     
immigration politics which takes seriously     
political community and the desire of citizens       
and newcomers to enjoy a home in the world.  
 
Global advocacy, focused on securing protections at the global level and imposing them on              
the political community, ironically abdicates responsibility for winning over citizens, and           
imposes that challenge on individual migrants themselves within the host society.           
Conversely, an immigration politics model focused on national or local campaigns appealing            
to citizens fosters solidarity between citizens and immigrants. As such, the host country is              
renewed as a political community, both in engaging its citizens actively as democratic moral              
actors and in gaining new members. Without political community there is neither political             
equality nor communal safeguards of any freedoms or rights, as Hannah Arendt understood             
(1968, [1950], p. 296). We need nationally based democratic immigration politics which            
takes seriously political community and the desire of citizens and newcomers to enjoy a              
home in the world.  
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Towards a responsible politics of cohesion Rakib Ehsan 
With the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union looming on the horizon,             
there is a golden opportunity for Brexit to be used as a project for social and democratic                 
renewal.  
One area of public policy where there must be a greater sense of purpose and urgency is                 
social cohesion. The UK has been labelled as a ‘plural state’. However, in recent times,               
multiculturalism – specifically the appreciation of cultural diversity – has increasingly           
attracted criticism. At a 2011 security conference in Munich, British PM David Cameron was              
of the view that ‘state multiculturalism is dead’. Similar statements were made back in              11
2010 by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who suggested that multiculturalism – ​multikulti            
– had failed in Germany. In part seeking to neutralise the political threat of Geert Wilders’                12
Party for Freedom, Dutch PM Mark Rutte publically decried the failure of multiculturalism in              
the Netherlands. Current French President Emmanuel Macron, while labelling himself as a            13
‘supporter of diversity’, openly claimed that he has no belief in multiculturalism. On the              14
11 BBC News, ‘State Multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron’,​ ​5 February 2011. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994​. 
12 ​BBC News, ‘Merkel says German multicultural society has failed’, 17 October 2010. Available at: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451​. 
13 Henley, J. ‘Netherlands PM says those who don’t respect customs should leave’. ​The Guardian, ​23 
January 2017. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/23/netherlands-pm-mark-rutte-dutch-citizens-open-letter-
pvv​. 
14 Ruthven, M. ‘How Europe lost faith in multiculturalism’, ​Financial Times, ​24 August 2017​. Available 
at: ​https://www.ft.com/content/dd122a8c-8720-11e7-8bb1-5ba57d47eff7​. 
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European Political Left, Danish Social Democrat PM Metter Frederiksen has publically raised            
the divisive effects of multiculturalism in Denmark.  15
In the British context, these debates are not new. A number of government-commissioned             
reports have expressed the view that more needs to be done to develop high-trust, cohesive               
communities in diverse parts of the UK. The 2001 Cantle and 2016 Casey reports on               
integration correctly identified social, residential, and economic segregation as a          
fundamental problem from a social cohesion perspective. Without sustained levels of           
intergroup contact, fewer opportunities for meaningful positive interactions between         
different ethnic groups are created. While social integration and interethnic contact can            
help to develop bonds of familiarity, understanding and mutual respect, social and           
occupational segregation can breed “suspicion of the unknown” and undermine trust.  16
A 2001 report written by Professor Ted Cantle suggested that intergroup tensions could be              
addressed through greater cross-community contact: “In order to combat the fear and            
ignorance of different communities which stems from a lack of contact with each other, we               
propose that each area should prepare a local cohesion plan as a significant part of its                
Community Strategy. This should include the promotion of cross-cultural contact between           
different communities at all levels, foster understanding and respect, and break down            
barriers.”  17
The central view advanced in the Cantle report was similarly expressed in a 2016 report               
authored by Dame Louise Casey: “There is strong evidence around the benefits that can              
derive from high levels of meaningful contact between people of different           
backgrounds…social mixing can increase trust and understanding between groups…a lack          
of mixing can increase community tensions and risk of conflict.”  18
Without sustained levels of intergroup contact,      
fewer opportunities for meaningful positive     
interactions between different ethnic groups     
are created. 
A lack of contact between different groups in racially and religiously diverse parts of “Urban               
Britain” – including a number of post-industrial towns in Northern England - is certainly an               
15 Orange, R. ‘Mette Frederiksen: the anti-immigration left leader set to win power in Denmark’, ​The 
Guardian, ​11 May 2019. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/11/denmark-election-matte-frederiksen-leftwing-immigr
ation​. 
16 Ehsan, R. (2019), ‘Discrimination, Social Relations and Trust: Civic Inclusion of British Ethnic 
Minorities – PhD Thesis’, Egham (Surrey), Royal Holloway, University of London. 
17 Cantle, T. (2001), ‘Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team’’ [online], 
Home Office. ​Available at: ​http://tedcantle.co.uk/pdf/communitycohesion%20cantlereport.pdf​. 
18 Casey, L. (2016), ‘The Casey Review: A review into opportunity and integration’ [online], 
Department for Communities and Local Government​. Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/575
973/The_Casey_Review_Report.pdf​. 
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issue from a counter-extremism perspective. Experiences of positive interethnic contact         
through participation in cross-community projects – skills schemes, health awareness         
workshops, inter-institution sporting competitions – can help to foster meaningful          
intergroup relations which act as an effective “shield” from deliberately divisive narratives            
constructed by extremist forces. 
The politics of cohesion needs to be rooted in realism and patience. As different ethnic and                
religious groups come into greater contact, there will be cultural misunderstandings, the            
offending of group-specific sensitivities, and hostile intergroup interactions. Unfortunately,         
a degree of conflict is inevitable. While ‘self-segregation’ may insulate one from such forms              
of negative intergroup contact, the drawbacks are hugely problematic. In the absence of             
positive social bonds beyond one’s own ethnic or religious group, unfamiliarity can breed             
‘suspicion of the unknown’ in diverse contexts. This in turn plays into the hands of               
extremists – both Islamist and far-right – who are presented with the social conditions              
which are ideal for their divisive narratives to gain traction.  
The politics of cohesion also includes the prioritization of a well-managed, regimented            
immigration system for the UK. From a social cohesion perspective, the UK should adopt a               
more rational and hard-headed approach to immigration policy. This includes ending           
freedom of movement with the EU in the post-Brexit context. A reformed immigration             
system ought to prioritise migrants whose main skills are well-matched to the demands of              
the UK economy. One possibility would be to prioritise individuals who come from             
Commonwealth countries with similar political and legal systems to the UK.  
The politics of cohesion needs to be       
rooted in realism and patience.  
Prioritising migrants who have been socialised under similar prevailing social norms and            
legal arrangements better enables socio-political incorporation when relocating to the ‘host           
country’ – in this case, the UK. The importance of possessing a reasonable command of the                
English language should not be underestimated in this context – as it helps to facilitate both                
social and labour market integration, as well as engagement with mainstream political            
processes. Ensuring high quality and properly funded English language tuition for all            
migrants to the UK who do not have adequate English should be a priority. 
Ambitious social-welfare schemes can only be sustained in high-trust, cohesive societies           
underpinned by a strong sense of collective membership. Bonds of social trust and mutual              
regard, along with the broader cultivation of a common identity, are critical in this context.               
In order to foster the level of cohesion required to sustain social-democratic endeavours –              
such as maintaining a robust welfare state – there has to be a degree of conditionality                
attached to the allocation of social rights. Reasonable boundaries must be maintained            
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around the membership of democratic political community, with the social, political, and            
economic integration of newcomers lying at the heart of a revamped community-oriented            
immigration system.  
For the UK to become more internally cohesive, policymakers must adopt a more critical              
view on the politics of ‘inclusion’ and ‘diversity’. These are concepts which have been overly               
prioritised in policy debates on integration and immigration. In order for the politics of social               
democracy to thrive in the UK, there has to be an acceptance of the drawbacks of cultural                 
diversity, as well as an acknowledgement of the potential benefits of stronger exclusionary             
restrictions over immigration.  
***** 
 
Revisiting the Relationship between Education and Citizenship Alex Standish 
 
‘​When the past no longer illuminates the future, the spirit walks in darkness.​’  
Alexis de Tocqueville, ​Democracy in America​ (1835) 
 
For the Greeks ​scholè meant “free time, rest, delay, study, discussion, class” (Massachelein             
and Simons, 2013). ‘Rest’ and ‘delay’ are a reference to the break ​scholè provided from               
contributing to society’s work. Importantly, it was considered detached from society (​polis)            
and household (​oikos​), such that external social demands did not interfere with learning.             
Similarly, Hannah Arendt discussed school as, “the institute that we interpose between the             
private domain of the home and the world in order to make the transition from family to                 
the world possible at all” ([1968]2006). She adds, “educators here stand in relation to the               
young as representatives of a world for which they must assume responsibility although             
they themselves did not make it.” Arendt notes that each generation grows, “into an old               
world” and that the teacher’s task is “to mediate between the old and the new.” Echoing                
Tocqueville’s sentiment, Arendt’s thesis was that “crisis in attitude towards the realm of the              
past” meant that American schools were not able to pass on society’s religious traditions              
and moral standards.  
In the twenty-first century, the ‘intergenerational conversation’ which mediates between          
“the old and the new” has become profoundly troublesome, leading to a hollowing out of               
the moral content of education and its capacity to prepare young people for their role as                
citizens. However, in England there has been some recognition of the problem, and both the               
Department for Education and Ofsted have sought to make amends with a new             
knowledge-led curriculum and a new inspection framework. In 2017, the newly appointed            
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chief of Ofsted proclaimed, ​“At the very heart of education sits the vast accumulated wealth               
of human knowledge and what we choose to impart to the next generation: the curriculum”               
(Amanda Spielman, 2017). While there has been something of knowledge-turn in English            
education, what this amounts to and how far it can establish a cultural shift in teaching                
remains to be seen.  
In this essay I will briefly examine the nature of the relationship between education and               
citizenship, the form it has taken in modern society and why, over recent decades, there has                
been a parallel demoralization of both.  
Democracy, liberalism and education  
In ​The Politics of Knowledge in Education​, Elizabeth Rata notes the parallel evolution of              
liberalism and capitalism: “the uneasy but workable settlement between liberalism and           
capitalism of the expansive industrial period was the condition for the extension of             
epistemic knowledge to the wider population” (Rata, 2012). This was an ‘uneasy’ settlement             
because it meant giving the demos a say in how society was governed, although women and                
all men did not gain voting rights until 1918 in England and 1920 in the USA. In both                  
countries education was important for citizen formation and imparting ruling ideology.           
Especially in the USA, with a population lacking a common culture and history, schools were               
looked to for national identity formation. For example, in ​The Making of Americans​, ED              
Hirsch quotes an extract from Governor Silas Wright’s 1845 address to the legislature: 
On the careful cultivation in our schools, of the minds of the young, the entire 
success or the absolute failure of the great experiment of self-government is wholly 
dependent; and unless that cultivation is increased, and made more effective than 
has yet been, the conviction is solemnly impressed by the signs of the times, that the 
American Union….will ere long share the melancholy fate of every former attempt 
of self-government (cited in Hirsch 2009).  
With citizenship in mind, a social studies curriculum was introduced in 1916, with a strong               
emphasis on American history and civics. In the 1920s, rituals such as the Pledge of               
Allegiance were introduced to schools.  
Induction into the moral order and education       
were one and the same. 
In England (if not the UK), the population shares a long history and common culture.               
Nevertheless, ruling elites made sure that schools were sites for the control and             
dissemination of their ideas. At the end of the nineteenth century, when Britain was              
enthralled in imperial rivalry, the geographer Halford Mackinder spoke of the importance of             
history and geography for teaching children to “think imperially” and come to see the world               
as a “theatre for British activity” (Mayhew 2000). At this time there was no clear dividing                
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line between epistemic knowledge and moral instruction; induction into the moral order            
and education were one and the same.  
Things began to change as democracy spread and the movement for progressive education             
emphasised autonomy of the individual and freedom of conscience. Progressives such as            
John Dewey highlighted the role of the child as an active agent rather than a passive                
receiver of knowledge. As James Hunter notes, this led to a “new found emphasis on the                
independence of the child for the purposes of liberating children to develop socially,             
intellectually and morally” (Hunter 2001). The liberal education tradition was developed           
strongly through the Chicago school of thought led by Robert Hutchins, John Dewey and              
Richard McKeon, but also stretches back to Kant’s notion of critical reason (Levine 2007).              
Liberal education is explicit in terms of the educational goals of developing autonomous             
individuals who are freed from the limits of their personal perspective. This necessitates             
“cultivation of critical thinking, an ability to judge the validity and reliability of knowledge              
claims, and an understanding of the merits and limitations of a particular mode of inquiry”               
(Deng, 2018). As Zongi Deng (2018) explains, liberal education involves “the cultivation of             
human powers, sensibility, self-awareness, liberty and freedom, responsibility and dignity”          
which are derived from “the methods or arts of inquiry embedded within the discipline”              
(2018: 374/6).  
The connection between disciplinary or epistemic knowledge and objective, critical          
reasoning, as a necessary component of liberal democracy, is elaborated further by Rata             
(2012). She reasons, “the objectivity and critical reasoning needed for scientific inquiry is             
also needed for democracy. Young people are prepared for citizenship, not by merely             
learning about being a citizen and what democracy is, but by being trained in the practices                
of objectivity and critical reasoning.” Rata suggests that while objective thought is important             
for comprehending and participating in the contractual relations of capitalist society, there            
is also an important social dimension. She suggests that scientific objective thinking enables             
people to think beyond the person such that “non-kin associations” are possible. Leesa             
Wheelahan (2010) places a similar value on the introduction of “systems of meaning in              
disciplinary knowledge” in schools because “unless students have access to the generative            
principles of disciplinary knowledge, they are not able to transcend the particular context”             
(Wheelahan, 2010). Both Wheelehan and Rata draw on Durkheim’s distinction between the            
sacred and profane, noting that deeper understanding and meaning can only be obtained by              
abstracting from everyday context and personal experience.  
The very nature of education, gaining access to        
new knowledge and skills, is a social act.  
The very nature of education, gaining access to new knowledge and skills, is a social act.                
While individuals may have their own thoughts, the concepts and facts through which we              
reason are social. Returning to Arendt’s notion of education as an inter-generational            
conversation, we can visualise education as induction into a social community. Below I will              
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say more about the curriculum and the content of education, but here it is important to                
note that while different types of school envisage ‘community’ differently (for example,            
religious school, progressive schools, international schools), in most countries schooling          
takes a national form with the state leading its organisation.  
In liberal democracies, induction into a national community and identity remains important,            
with, as Rata suggests, “partial loyalty to the nation state” being a key function of education.                
She notes that in addition to epistemic knowledge, the curriculum includes “social            
knowledge” about the community and the nation. This would include historical,           
geographical and cultural narratives about the nation, traditions, festivals, customs,          
symbols, institutions, norms and significant people, such as great writers, artists or            
explorers. A school curriculum then comprises both disciplinary and social knowledge, which            
will tend to blend together in subjects like history and English. While disciplines have their               
own communities that transcend national boundaries, the curriculum – what knowledge we            
want to pass on to the next generation – is tied to “philosophical and political questions                
about who we are and what we value” (Young 2008). Through the study of sciences,               
humanities, arts, mathematics and languages, children are challenged to explore what is            
true, what is right and what is beautiful (Standish and Sehgal Cuthbert, 2017). So, while the                
curriculum is culturally-rooted, it introduces children to other cultures, other people, other            
environments and ways of living.  
In recognising that citizenship is a broad category, we can note that education has several               
functions that contribute to the cultivation of citizens. ​Gert Biesta (2010) identifies three             
purposes for education: qualification, socialisation and subjectification. One of the functions           
of schools is to help children to obtain socially-sanctioned qualifications which will help             
them move into fruitful employment or access higher education. Most qualifications are            
nationally organised, sanctioned by the Department for Education and its regulating body –             
Ofqual (Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation). Passing qualifications gives a           
focus to study and provides ​validation of learning for students. As markers of achievement,              
qualifications have significance for life after school – both further study and employment.             
While knowledge gained in a qualification may or may not be directly applicable in the               
workplace, many employers view them as proxies of work habits, skills and dispositions,             
especially the ability to apply oneself to a given task and succeed (Wolf, 2002).  
The selection of curriculum content is linked to        
who we are and what we value and hence will          
always reflect local and national culture. 
Schools are also communities where children learn to socialise with peers and are inducted              
into societal norms and traditions by teachers and other staff. Through school, “we become              
part of particular social, cultural and political ‘orders’,” suggests Biesta (2010). We noted             
above that the selection of curriculum content is linked to ‘who we are and what we value’                 
and hence will always reflect the local and national culture, values and traditions. But, there               
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is also more to a school than a curriculum. There are extra-curricular activities such as               
performing in plays, musicals and sports, festivals, contributing to the local community,            
school trips and partner schools in other countries. Thus, the community reaches out             
beyond the school to make connections with people both near and far, providing             
opportunities for pupils to engage with people and society beyond the school gate. By              
providing children with such opportunities they can find different niches through which to             
develop talents, to learn to get along with other people, to talk with strangers, to learn how                 
to conduct themselves in public and also to recognise the boundaries between public and              
private space. We could say that socialisation is preparation for adult life after school.              
Whether or not knowledge learnt in studying a subject is directly applicable outside of              
school, it develops maturity and often changes a person’s perspective on life and values.  
Biesta’s third purpose, ‘subjectification’, means the process of becoming a subject or author             
of our own lives. Biesta suggests that educational experiences and knowledge can be viewed              
as “coming into presence” with the world. This is a gradual and relational process in which                
the pupils’ experience of the world is mediated by the teacher. Biesta describes it as ​“a                
process through which we come into the world…and the world comes into us” (2012). And,               
as it comes into us, we learn to see the world anew – the pupil’s eyes are opened to new                    
horizons and questions they have never previously considered, let alone tried to answer.  
While subjects introduce children to disciplinary-specific ways of enquiry and practice the            
aim is for the pupil to slowly take ownership of these ways of thinking and doing, as they                  
learn to pursue questions for themselves. Biesta explains it thus: “The key educational             
challenge therefore, is not simply to tell the child or student which of their desires are                
desirable, but for this question to become a living question in the life of the child or                 
student” (Biesta, 2017). In other words, it takes the skill of an impassioned teacher to draw                
a child into the intellectual mind set of the discipline and show them that there are                
potentially more interesting and profound ideas and practices to be concerned with than             
the everyday preoccupations of the average teenager. Through dedication to study pupils            
begin to internalise values associated with intellectual work including “devotion, respect,           
attention and passion” (Masschelein and Simons, 2015). As children begin to internalise            
knowledge and intellectual habits from the teacher “the self of the student takes form”              
(​Ibid​). 
Here, we can envisage the dualistic quality of education: that as we learn more about the                
world we learn more about ourselves. As Hunter suggests, “Character is…the embodiment            
of the ideals of a moral order – it is formed in relation to the imperatives of that moral order                    
that are embedded in the life of a community of moral discourse” (2001). While I have                
explored here the potential for education to prepare young people for citizenship, the             
problem today is that there is little in the way of a moral order to uphold.  
The retreat from democracy and disciplinary knowledge 
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The fact that in this essay and elsewhere an argument for the value of disciplinary               
knowledge in education has to be made is indicative of the reality it no longer holds the                 
cultural validity it once did. As Rata notes, in previous decades societies worked under the               
assumption that disciplinary knowledge would advance society culturally, economically and          
politically through its institutions (especially schools and universities) and individuals.  
Leesa Wheelahan (2010) provides a helpful account of how, over recent decades,            
“knowledge was dethroned in society and displaced in curriculum,” eroding social trust in its              
truthfulness, objectivity and specialised status. One cause, notes Wheelahan, is the blurring            
of the boundaries between different knowledge types (especially academic and vocational           
knowledge) combined with an instrumentalist approach to knowledge which replaces a           
performance-based curriculum with a competence-based one. She notes the shift in           
universities from universal epistemologies to context-dependent knowledge based on         
experience rather than abstraction, with the resulting tendency to conflate knowledge with            
experience. Biesta (2010) similarly laments the replacement of normative validity with           
technical validity, whereby schools have come to value what they measure rather than what              
is valuable (education). He describes the “learnification” of education, where questions of            
purpose and content are secondary to the process of learning.  
In both schools and universities the curriculum has, over time, become deprioritised, with             
academic aims being overtaken by other concerns such as safeguarding, health and            
well-being, data and accountability, vocational skills, cultural sensitivity, consumer         
satisfaction and environmental sustainability (Whelan, 2007; Eccelstone and Hayes, 2009;          
Furedi, 2017). Since the 1970s, ‘the democracy-capitalism settlement of the industrial era            
has weakened’ reports (Rata, 2012). The same is true for the relationship between             
education and democracy, as the curriculum has become driven by instrumental aims tied             
to the neoliberal market, transnationalism, environmentalism and a superficial cultural          
tolerance. This remains an elite ideology, but now serves their global, neoliberal agenda in              
which citizens and the community are more objects to be acted upon rather than active               
subjects shaping their future (Standish, 2012; Runciman, 2016).  
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